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Case No. 20080772-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Tina Harding, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of methamphetamine, a 
second degree felony, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 
a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008-2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the traffic stop de-escalate to a level one voluntary encounter before 
Officer Westerman obtained the driver's consent to search? 
2. Did Officer Westerman reasonably believe the driver's consent to search 
the vehicle included two backpacks stowed in a compartment behind the back seat? 
Standard of Review. The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2004 UT 94, 1f 11,100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed 
non-deferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to 
the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ]f 15,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a 
drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008-2009); possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
503(2) (b) (West 2004); false information to a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-507(2) (West 2004); and possession of 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. §58-37a-5a (West 2004 & Supp. 2008-2009). R2-1. 
Motion to suppress denied. Defendant, a passenger in a vehicle stopped for 
a traffic violation, moved to suppress contraband seized pursuant to the driver's 
2 
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consent to search the vehicle. R39-35. The trial court denied the motion in a written 
Memorandum Decision. R77-69 (a copy is attached). 
Conditional guilty plea. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, defendant 
pled guilty to felony drug and weapons charges with the condition that she could 
challenge the trial court's ruling on appeal; the misdemeanor charges were 
dismissed. See R95-87; see also R98-97 and R105-04. 
Sentence. The trial court imposed the statutory indeterminate terms of one to 
fifteen years for the second degree felony, and zero to five years for the third degree 
felony. R103. The trial court then suspended imposition of the prison terms and 
placed defendant on probation for thirty-six months. R101. 
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R106. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
1. On February 22, 2008, Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a traffic 
stop on a vehicle for an inoperable plate lamp. The stop occurred at 
approximately 9:30 p.m. 
2. Upon running a routine check on the driver, Officer Westerman 
discovered that the driver's license had been denied. 
3. To ascertain whether or not there was a licensed driver who could 
drive the vehicle from the scene, Officer Westerman requested the 
1
 The facts are set forth in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. 
See State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157,1158 (Utah App. 1997). 
3 
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names and dates of birth for each of the passengers and discovered that 
none of the passengers had a valid license. [2] 
4. Officer Westerman asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a 
citation for an inoperable plate lamp and the denied driver's license. 
5. Officer Westerman allowed the driver to contact someone to get the 
vehicle and told the driver she was free to leave. 
6. The driver then came back with an additional question or comment. 
At that point Officer Westerman requested permission to look in the 
vehicle and the driver gave consent. 
7. A second officer arrived at the scene by the time Officer Westerman 
asked the driver to search the vehicle, but was not involved in the 
search. [3] 
8. During the search of the vehicle, Officer Westerman searched the 
defendant's bags.[4] They were located in a storage area directly 
behind the seat in which the defendant sat as a passenger in the 
vehicle. 
9. Before searching the bags, neither [defendant] nor any of the [other] 
passengers indicated to whom the bags belonged. 
10. Drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine and items identifying 
[defendant] as the owner of the bags were found in the bags during the 
search. 
2
 In total, there were three passengers in the car: John Zuran sat in front, 
while Josh Kelly and defendant sat in back. R112:5-6. 
3
 Defendant acknowledged below that the emergency lights on both patrol 
cars were turned off before the driver was even asked out of her car. See R58 
("Driver was asked to exit her vehicle and prior to her exiting the vehicle both 
officerfs] had shut off the emergency lights"), and R57 ("The emergency lights of the 
patrol cars were turned off before Driver exited her car"). 
4
 The bags searched were "two backpacks." R112:8. 
4 
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11. Due to the evidence found in the bags, Officer Westerman arrested 
[defendant] and during the search incident to arrest, Officer 
Westerman found a blade knife on [defendant's] person. 
R76-75. The parties stipulated that the " initial traffic stop was legal/' and that 
"defendant ha[d] standing to challenge the search, because she had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them." R75. 
Based on the above, the trial court concluded that 1) the traffic stop de-
escalated to a level one voluntary encounter before Officer Westerman obtained the 
driver's consent to search the car; and 2) the driver's consent to search included 
backpacks stowed behind the backseat. See R72-70. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. The trial court correctly ruled that the traffic stop de-escalated to a 
consensual encounter before Officer Westerman obtained the driver's consent to 
search; therefore, the driver's consent to search was untainted. The traffic stop de-
escalated when the officer returned the driver's documents, issued pertinent 
citations, and told the driver she was free to leave. After the stop de-escalated to a 
consensual encounter, the driver re-approached Officer Westerman and initiated a 
conversation, wherein the officer obtained the driver's consent to search. Given the 
driver's consent to search, there was necessarily further need to control the scene, so 
5 
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that the search could be safely conducted. The vehicle occupants were, therefore, 
lawfully seized until the search was completed. 
Point II. The trial court ruled that defendant showed no possessory or 
ownership interest in the vehicle. Accordingly, defendant had no expectation of 
privacy in the car itself, and may not challenge the voluntariness of the driver's 
consent to search it. However, defendant did have an expectation of privacy in her 
personal property in the vehicle and may therefore challenge the search of her 
backpacks. That search was lawful because Officer Westerman reasonably believed 
that the driver's general consent to search the vehicle included the packs. The 
officer's belief was reasonable because (1) the packs were stowed in a compartment 
behind the back seat, an area that is typically controlled by the owner/driver, (2) 
there was nothing about the packs themselves that suggested they could not belong 
to the driver, and (3) the driver did not volunteer that the packs belonged to 
defendant. Accordingly, there was no reason for Officer Westerman to believe that 
the driver's consent to search did not encompass the packs. 
The trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress should be upheld. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRAFFIC STOP DE-ESCALATED TO A CONSENSUAL 
ENCOUNTER BEFORE OFFICER WESTERMAN OBTAINED THE 
DRIVER'S CONSENT TO SEARCH 
In Point 1(A) of her brief, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling that the 
traffic stop de-escalated to a level one voluntary encounter before the vehicle was 
searched. Aplt. Br. at 9-14. Defendant asserts that absent"reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause" the occupants were engaged in criminal activity, "she should have 
been allowed to leave the scene while the search of the vehicle took place." Aplt. Br. 
at 13-14. Claiming she was illegally detained when her bags were searched, 
defendant reasons that all the evidence seized should be suppressed. Aplt. Br. at 14. 
Defendant's claim lacks merit and should be rejected. 
A. The traffic stop de-escalated to a consensual encounter when 
Officer Westerman returned the driver's documents, issued 
pertinent citations, and told the driver she was free to go. 
A traffic stop constitutes a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protection. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653 (1979); accord State v. Hansen, 2002 UT125,128, 
63 P.3d 650. However, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and 
seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 
(1991). The reasonableness of a traffic stop, like any other seizure, "is judged by 
7 
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balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate government interests." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 (footnote 
omitted). 
Because "a traffic stop is a limited search and is more like an investigative 
detention than a custodial arrest/7 it must satisfy the two-part test established by the 
United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). State v. Parker, 834 
P.2d 592,594 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted); accord Hansen, 2002 UT125, \ 29. 
First, the stop must be "'justified at its inception/' Hansen, 2002 UT 125, % 29 
(citations omitted). Second, the resulting detention must be "'reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.'" Id. The 
parties stipulated below that "[t]he initial traffic stop was legal." R75. Thus, the 
only question here is whether Officer Westerman's request, and the ensuing vehicle 
search, exceeded the scope of the initially lawful traffic stop. As will be shown 
below, it did not. 
"While a traffic stop may begin as an investigatory detention, it is possible for 
it to de-escalate to a consensual encounter." Id. at ]f 37 (case citation omitted). 
"Since a consensual encounter is not a seizure, questioning during such an 
encounter is lawful, regardless of scope, as long as the person remains a willing 
8 
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participant/' Id. (case citation omitted). "A traffic stop de-escalates to a consensual 
encounter when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, that he or she is free to end the encounter cind depart." Id. at f^ 39 
(citations omitted). As recognized in Hansen, "[a]s a threshold matter, an encounter 
initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed consensual unless the driver's 
documents have been returned to him, because absent the return of documents, a 
person legally could not proceed on is way." Id. at f^ 40 (citations and quotation 
marks omitted). Here, as in Hansen, this threshold requirement was met because 
Officer Westerman returned the driver's documents before asking for consent to 
search the vehicle. Id.) see also R74, 72. 
While returning the driver's documents is a threshold factor, "no single factor 
is dispositive." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, *[j 41 (citations omitted). Other factors 
supporting de-escalation "include informing a person he is free to leave, or that he 
does not have to answer additional questions." Id. (citations omitted). Factors 
supporting a failure to de-escalate, on the other hand, include "fail[ing] to issue a 
warning or citation before engaging in additional questioning," making "a coercive 
show of authority," such as having more than one officer present, displaying a 
9 
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weapon, physically touching the occupants, or using a commanding tone of voice. 
Id. 
Applying these factors in Hansen, the Utah Supreme Court held that the traffic 
stop at issue in that case did not ultimately de-escalate, even though the officer 
returned Hansen's documents. Id. at ]f 46. The supreme court observed that Officer 
Huntington, who initiated the traffic stop of Hansen, was initially the only officer 
present, and that he never made any coercive show of authority. Id. at ]f 43. 
However, "[s]ince these factors were never present to begin with, a reasonable 
person would not be able to discern a seizure had de-escalated to a consensual 
encounter due to the absence of such factors at the time of additional questioning/7 
Id. Additionally, by the time Officer Huntington engaged in additional questioning 
of Hansen,"there was an arguably threatening presence of more than one officer/7 
Id. at % 44. A "second patrol car had its lights flashing, and it pulled in behind 
Hansen's vehicle/7 Id. Moreover, Officer Huntington did not request to search 
Hansen's vehicle until the second officer had exited his patrol car and was standing 
next to Officer Huntington's patrol car. Id. Given these circumstances, the supreme 
court concluded that "a reasonable person actually may have believed that the 
encounter was escalating rather than de-escalating.77 Id. 
10 
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The supreme court observed that other factors also supported a failure to de-
escalate in Hansen. Particularly, Officer Huntington told Hansen that he stopped 
him for an illegal lane change and because he had no vehicle insurance. Id. at ]f 45. 
But when Officer Huntington returned Hansen's documents "he did not address the 
illegal lane change before he started questioning Hansen about contraband." Id. 
Moreover, Officer Huntington never told Hansen "that he was free to leave or that 
he did not have to answer additional questions." Id. Looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, the supreme court questioned whether a reasonable person would 
have felt free to leave "before being issued a warning or citation, or at least being 
told he or she could leave." Id. 
Here, in contrast to Hansen, Officer Westerman not only returned the driver's 
documents, but also issued pertinent citations, and told the driver she was free to 
go. R72. There is no indication in the record that Officer Westerman made a 
coercive show of authority by displaying a weapon, physically touching the driver, 
or using a commanding tone of voice. While another officer appeared on the scene 
during the traffic stop, this factor is alone insufficient to show a failure to de-
escalate, particularly where, as acknowledged by defendant below, the emergency 
lights on both patrol cars were turned off before the driver was even asked out of 
11 
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her car. See R58-57. Finally, as found by the trial court, Officer Westerman did not 
re-approach the driver; rather, after being told she was free to leave, the driver re-
approached him and initiated conversation. See R75. It was only after the driver re-
approached and initiated conversation with Officer Westerman that he asked her 
for —and received —consent to search the vehicle. Id. 
In sum, looking at the totality of the circumstances here, the trial court 
properly distinguished Hansen and concluded that the traffic stop de-escalated to a 
consensual encounter before Officer Westerman obtained the driver's consent to 
search. See R75. Because the stop de-escalated to a consensual encounter, neither 
Officer Westerman's request for consent to search, nor the vehicle search itself, 
exceeded the scope of the detention. 
B. After the traffic stop de-escalated to a consensual encounter, the 
driver initiated conversation with Officer Westerman and granted 
consent to search the car, creating further need to control the 
scene. 
Since the trial court ruled here, the United States Supreme Court clarified in 
Arizona v. Johnson that drivers and passengers are reasonably detained incident to a 
traffic stop, "for the duration of the stop," or until "[officers] have no further need to 
control the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave." 
12 
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U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 781, 788 (2009) (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258 
(2007)). 
Here, the traffic stop de-escalated to a consensual encounter and the driver 
was told that she was free to leave. However, when the driver thereafter initiated 
conversation with Officer Westerman and granted consent to search the car, there 
necessarily arose "further need to control the scene" until the consensual search 
could be safely concluded. Id. Cf. People v. Hoyos, 162 P.3d 528, 546 (Cal. 2007) 
(upholding detention of driver and passenger reasonably seized following 
Mimms/Wilson order to exit vehicle "at least as long as reasonably necessary for the 
officer to complete the activity [an inventory search] the Mimms/Wilson order 
contemplates). Johnson did not involve a consensual vehicle search as here, but 
safety concerns arise any time an officer is authorized to search a vehicle, whether 
the search is justified by probable cause or consent. Accordingly, where as here, a 
vehicle search is authorized by the driver's consent, there is "further need to control 
the scene." Johnson. 129 S.Ct. at 788. Any other rule would unnecessarily 
jeopardize officer safety. The Fourth Amendment does not require this. See, e.g., 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (recognizing "too plain for 
argument" public interest in officer safety "both legitimate and weighty"). 
13 
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Accordingly, the driver and her passengers, including defendant, were lawfully 
detained during the consensual vehicle search. 
II. 
OFFICER WESTERMAN REASONABLY BELIEVED THE 
DRIVER'S CONSENT AUTHORITY EXTENDED TO BACKPACKS 
STOWED IN A COMPARTMENT BEHIND THE BACK SEAT 
In Point I(B)-(C) of her brief, defendant asserts that the (1) driver's consent to 
search the vehicle was tainted by the alleged illegal detention, and (2) did not 
reasonably include the backpacks stowed in an area behind the back seat. Aplt. Br. 
at 14-25. Defendant's claims lack merit. 
A. Defendant had no expectation of privacy in the car itself and 
cannot therefore challenge the voluntariness of the driver's 
consent to search it. 
Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature and may not be vicariously 
asserted. State v. Earl, 2004 UT App 163, 110, 92 P.3d 167; State v. Sepulveda, 842 
P.2d 913,915 (Utah App. 1992). A defendant may not invoke the exclusionary rule, 
even where an unreasonable search has occurred, unless she has a "legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 
(1978). "A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search . . . of a third person's 
premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed." 
Id. at 134. "Furthermore, '[o]nce the defendant has been put on notice that the state 
14 
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claims the warrantless search was constitutional because [the defendant] has no 
expectation of privacy in the area searched, then the defendant must factually 
demonstrate" that he does, in fact, have a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 915 (quoting State v. Marshall 791 R2d 880, 887 (Utah App. 
1990) (alterations in original). This expectation of privacy is sometimes called 
"Fourth Amendment standing."5 
Here, the prosecutor conceded that defendant could "challenge the search 
because she has a shown a legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags that were 
searched during the traffic stop." R48 (emphasis added),. Accordingly, the trial 
court found that "defendant has standing to challenge the search, because she had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them." R75; 
see also R74 (citing State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178). The trial court 
clarified, however, that defendant had no "possessory or ownership interest in the 
vehicle — she was just a passenger." R71. Therefore, defendant cannot challenge the 
voluntariness of the driver's consent to search the car, or Officer Westerman's entry 
of the car. See State v. Prows, 2007 UT App 409, ^ 22,178 P.3d 908 (holding Prows, a 
passenger, had no standing to challenge the vehicle owner's consent to search); 
5
 For a discussion of the theoretical interplay between traditional principles of 
standing and substantive Fourth Amendment rights, see Rakas, 439 US. at 138-140. 
15 
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Bissegger, 2003 UT App 256, f^ 8 (recognizing "a car passenger does not normally 
have standing to object to a search of the car absent an ownership or possessory 
interest in the car") (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49); see also Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
& Seizure, § 11.3(e) at 196-97 (4th ed. 2004) (recognizing post-Rates, "it is doubtful" a 
mere passenger can establish "an expectation [of privacy] anywhere in the vehicle"). 
Because defendant lacks 4th amendment standing to challenge the search of the 
vehicle — as opposed to the backpacks — the State does not address her challenge to 
the voluntariness of the driver's consent to search the vehicle.6 
B. Defendant had an expectation of privacy in her backpacks and 
may therefore challenge their search, or the reasonableness of 
Officer Westerman's belief that the driver's consent to search the 
car included the packs. 
While defendant cannot challenge the voluntariness of the driver's consent to 
search the car, the State agrees that defendant had an expectation of privacy in her 
personal property found therein. Accordingly, defendant can challenge whether 
Officer Westerman reasonably believed the driver's authority to consent extended to 
the two packs stowed in the rear storage compartment. 
6
 Even if defendant had a possessory or ownership interest in the car, her 
challenge to the voluntariness of the driver's consent to search would still fail. As 
shown in Point 1(A), the stop de-escalated to a consensual encounter before Officer 
Westerman obtained the driver's consent; thus, the consent was not tainted. 
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A warrantless—but consensual — search is reasonable. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 
U.S. 248, 250-252 (1991). Moreover, it is reasonable, not only if the defendant 
consents to the search, but also if a person other than the defendant, with authority 
over the premises, consents to the search. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,170 
(1974); see also State v. Messer, 2007 UT App 166, | 21,164 P.3d 421 ("If a third party 
rather than the defendant consents to a search, the third party must be one who 
possesses 'common authority7 over the area or has some other 'sufficient 
relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected") (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Finally, a consensual "search is valid even in instances where the 
third party does not possess common authority, as long as [officers]' reasonably 
believe[ ]' that the third party possesses such authority." Id. (quoting Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,189 (1990)). 
Here, defendant does not dispute that the driver had authority to consent to a 
search of the car itself. Rather, defendant challenges only the trial court's conclusion 
that "the driver had the authority to consent to the search of [defendant's] property 
which was located in the vehicle." Aplt. Br. at 24. This Court upheld a similar 
search in Messer, 2007 UT App 166, ^ 21, where officers found meth lab equipment 
in the trunk of a car. Specifically, Messer challenged the search of the car that was 
parked on a third-party's property. Id. at f^ 20. Messer asserted that the third 
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party's authority to consent to the search did not extend to bags in the trunk. Id. 
This Court disagreed, holding that, as custodian of the car, the third party had at 
least common authority over the trunk. Id. at ]f 21. Moreover, the trunk search was 
valid, even if the third party did not in fact possess common authority over the 
trunk, because officers reasonably believed the third party possessed common 
authority over it. Id. Applying Messer here, it was reasonable for Officer 
Westerman to believe that the driver had authority to consent to the search of the 
backpacks: They were found in the storage area behind the back seat, an area, not 
unlike a trunk, which is typically controlled by the owner/driver, and there was 
nothing about the packs (like an identification tag) that suggested they could not 
belong to the driver. Accordingly, Officer Westerman reasonably believed that the 
driver had authority to consent to the search of the packs. See United States v. 
Hammons, 152 F.3d 1025,1028 (8th Cir. 1998) (officer reasonably believed garment 
bag in trunk belonged to Hammons' wife, who consented to vehicle search, where 
officer testified he did not see airline identification tag on bag); State v. Sawyer, 784 
A.2d 1208, 1212-13 (N.H. 2001) (officer reasonably believed bag belonged to 
consenting driver where bag like those used "to hold tape cassettes and compact 
discs" and "was not of a type that, on its face, could not reasonably have been 
believed to belong to [driver]"); State v. Maristany, 627 A.2d 1066,1070 (N.J. 1993) 
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(trooper reasonably believed driver had authority to consent to search of luggage in 
trunk where "there was nothing to alert [him] that both, none, or only one of the 
bags belonged to [driver]. Neither bag contained identification," "type of luggage, a 
canvas gym bag and a suitcase, did not compel the conclusion that one bag 
belonged to each of the occupants"). This is particularly true where the driver did 
not volunteer that the packs belonged to defendant. See United States v. Navarro, 169 
F.3d 228,232 (5th Cir. 1999) (search of luggage in plain view on back seat pursuant 
to driver's consent to search vehicle reasonable, where driver did not tell officer 
luggage belonged to passenger). And defendant did not claim the packs or 
otherwise object to their search. Id. (noting Navarro did not object to the luggage 
search); see also Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070 (noting Maristany did not claim 
ownership of gym bag).7 Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled that "officer 
Westerman had no way of knowing whose bags they were; he just proceeded to 
7
 None of the above cases turns on whether the defendant/ passenger 
overheard the officer obtain the driver's consent to search. Because the record is 
unclear whether the passengers here overheard Officer Westerman's conversation 
with the driver, the State does not rely on cases where the passenger/defendant's 
knowledge of the driver's consent was deemed pivotal. See, e.g., State v. Franks, 650 
N.W.2d 213,215, 219 (Minn. App. 2002) (holding "no factual basis for a finding of 
apparent authority of the driver to consent to the search of [Frank's] suitcase" found 
in trunk, where officer asked for driver's consent to search vehicle " [o]ut of [Frank's] 
hearing"). 
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search the contents of the vehicle." R70. While it may be "better law enforcement 
practice . . . for police officers to specifically inquire and attempt to ascertain 
ownership of luggage in a vehicle with several occupants, rather than to rely on the 
driver's consent to search," the Fourth Amendment does not require it. See United 
States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1994) (observing officers "do not have to 
separately request permission to search each closed container in a vehicle, and a 
driver's general consent to a search of the car includes consent to examine a paper 
bag on the floor"). "The validity of the search does not depend on whether the 
[officer] used the best procedure, but rather on whether the officer's conduct was 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances." Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070. 
Finally, defendant asserts that because Officer Westerman did not tell the 
driver what he was looking for, the ensuing search necessarily exceeded the 
scope of the driver's consent. See Aplt. Br. at 24. While "[t]he scope of consent is 
usually defined by its expressed object," ]imeno, 500 U.S. at 251, the Fourth 
Amendment does not require an officer to identify the object of his search, or to 
reveal why he is requesting consent to search. Rather, "[t]he standard for 
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that 
of 'objective' reasonableness —what would the typical reasonable person have 
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understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Id.; accord 
State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992). Moreover, r/[w]hile a suspect 
may limit the scope of the search to which he or she has consented, 'if [that] 
consent would reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the 
Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit 
authorization." Castner, 825 P.2d at 705 (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252) 
(additional case citation omitted); accord United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 
1041 (7th Cir. 2000) (recognizing general rule, "consent to search a space includes 
consent to search containers within that space where a reasonable officer would 
construe the consent to extend to the container"). 
Here, Officer Westerman did not tell the driver why he wanted to search the 
car, but it was obvious that he was looking for contraband, and any reasonable 
person would have so understood. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251; see also Grain, 33 F.3d at 
484 (discussing Jimeno and rejecting passenger's claim that because "officers never 
stated, or even implied, what they were looking for in the car," driver's general 
consent to search could not have reasonably included closed paper bag shoved 
under seat). Moreover, an objectively reasonable person would have further 
understood that contraband could be hidden in the car itself, as well as inside the 
packs stowed in the rear storage area. Id. 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In sum, Officer Westerman reasonably believed that the driver's consent to 
search the vehicle included the two backpacks. The packs were stowed in a 
compartment behind the back seat (an area typically controlled by the 
owner/driver), there was nothing about the packs themselves that suggested they 
could not belong to the driver, and the driver did not volunteer that the packs 
belonged to defendant. Finally, it was obvious that the officer was looking for 
contraband and that contraband could be hidden not only in the vehicle itself, but 
also inside containers found therein. Given the totality of these circumstances, the 
trial court correctly ruled that the backpacks "were within the scope of the consent 
given to search the vehicle/7 or that Officer Westerman reasonably believed that the 
driver's general consent to search the vehicle included the backpacks in the rear 
storage compartment. R70. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 22 June 2009. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TINA MARIE HARDING, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Case No. 081400645 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
June 12,2008 
This matter came before the court for oral arguments on the defendant's Motion to 
Suppress on June 4, 2008. The plaintiff, State of Utah, was represented by its attorney, Craig R. 
Johnson, The defendant appeared in custody of the Utah County Sheriff and was represented by 
Barbara A. Gonzales. Having reviewed the file, the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the 
memoranda presented by both parties, and the oral arguments made by the parties, the court issues 
the following: 
I. PROCEDUAL HISTORY 
1. On March 19, 2008, during the preliminary hearing, the court bound over the defendant 
for trial on 1) illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, 2) possession or use of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 3) false information to a police officer, and 4) 
use or possession of drug paraphernalia. 
2. The defendant filed her Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support of her Motion to 
Suppress on April 25, 2008. 
1 
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3. On May 2, 2008, the State filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
4. On May 28, 2008, the court requested additional pleadings addressing State v. Hansen, 63 
P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). 
5. The defense filed her additional memorandum on June 2, 2008 and the State filed its 
additional memorandum on June 3, 2008. 
6. The court heard oral arguments on June 4, 2008 and took the matter under advisement. 
II. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 22, 2008, Officer Jeffery Westerman initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle for 
an inoperable plate lamp. The stop occurred at approximately 9:30 p.m. 
2. Upon running a routine check on the driver, Officer Westerman discovered that the 
driver's license had been denied. 
3. To ascertain whether or not there was a licensed driver who could drive the vehicle from 
the scene, Officer Westerman requested the names and dates of birth for each of the 
passengers and discovered that none of the passengers had a valid license. 
4. Officer Westerman asked the driver to exit the vehicle and issued a citation for an 
inoperable plate lamp and the denied driver's license. 
5. Officer Westerman allowed the driver to contact someone to get the vehicle and told the 
driver that she was free to leave. 
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6. The driver then came back with an additional question or comment. At that point Officer 
Westerman requested permission to look in the vehicle and the driver gave consent. 
7. A second officer arrived at the scene by the time Officer Westerman asked the driver to 
search the vehicle, but was not involved in the search. 
8. During the search of the vehicle, Officer Westerman searched the defendant's bags. They 
were located in a storage area directly behind the seat in which the defendant sat as a 
passenger in the vehicle. 
9. Before searching the bags, neither Ms. Harding nor any of the other passengers indicated 
to whom the bags belonged. 
10. Drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine and items identifying Ms. Harding as the owner 
of the bags were found in the bags during the search. 
11. Due to the evidence found in the bags, Officer Westerman arrested Ms. Harding and 
during the search incident to arrest, Officer Westerman found a blade knife on Ms. 
Harding's person. 
II. PARTIES'STIPULATIONS 
12. The initial traffic stop was legal. 
13. The defendant has standing to challenge the search, because she had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them. 
III. DISCUSSION 
The parties have stipulated to two important issues that the court would normally have to 
determine in a case such as this. First, the defense acknowledged and the court finds that the traffic 
3 
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stop conducted by Officer Westerman was justified at its inception. Second, the State has 
acknowledged and the court finds that Ms. Harding has standing to challenge the constitutionality 
of the vehicle search because she had a reasonable expectation to privacy in her bags and she never 
abandoned them. In State v. Bissegger, 16 P.3d 178 (Utah App. 2003), the trial court denied the 
motion to suppress because it determined that the defendant lacked standing. The Bissegger court 
overturned that ruling, concluding that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her 
belongings and that she never abandoned them. Unlike Bissegger, in the case before the Court 
here, standing and abandonment are not disputed. 
But similar to Bissegger, the Court must now determine whether the search of the vehicle 
conducted by Officer Westerman was lawful. To determine this, the Court must ask three 
questions. First, was Officer Westerman's action in stopping the vehicle justified at its inception? 
Second, did the search of the vehicle exceed the scope of the detention? And third, were Ms. 
Harding's bags within the scope of the consent to search the vehicle? As noted above, both parties 
agree that the answer to the first question is yes: the initial stop was lawful. Thus, the court is left to 
determine whether the search exceeded the scope of the detention and whether Ms. Harding's bags 
were within the scope of the consent to search the vehicle. 
A. DID THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE EXCEED THE SCOPE OF THE 
DETENTION? 
In general an officer must have a warrant to search a vehicle, but one of the exceptions to 
the warrant requirement is voluntary consent of the vehicle owner. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1217-18 (Utah 1993). Here, it is undisputed that Officer Westerman obtained the consent of 
the driver before searching the vehicle. However, as seen in both Bissegger and State v. Hansen, 
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63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002), a search may be illegal even with consent if the search exceeds the scope 
of the detention. In both of those cases, the consent obtained was not valid because the traffic stop 
had not de-escalated to a consensual encounter. Similarly, Officer Westerman's search of the 
vehicle would be legal only if he had obtained consent after the encounter had de-escalated to a 
consensual encounter. 
Hansen sets out an excellent roadmap of analysis to determine whether an encounter has 
de-escalated or not. The general rule is that "a traffic stop de-escalates to a consensual encounter 
when a reasonable person would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or she 
is free to.. .depart." Id at 661. As a threshold matter "a stop may not be consensual unless the 
driver's documents have been returned to him." Id, But, when the facts of a case pass this threshold 
matter (as it did in Hansen and as it does in the case before the court), the court must look to other 
factors to determine whether a traffic stop has de-escalated. As set out in Hansen, "informing a 
person he is free to leave, or that he does not have to answer additional questions" weighs in favor 
of de-escalation. Id. But a "coercive show of authority, such as the presence of more than one 
officer, the display of a weapon, physical touching by the officer, or his use of a commanding tone 
of voice" weighs against de-escalation. Id at 662. The Hansen court explained that, under the facts 
of that case, a reasonable person would not think the encounter at issue in the case had 
de-escalated; in fact, a reasonable person could believe that the encounter had escalated. Id. First, 
the factual differences between the initial stop and the additional questioning were minimal in that 
the show of force by the questioning officer had not materially changed. Id. Second, at the time of 
the additional questioning, a second patrol car with its lights on arrived on the scene, which could 
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have made a reasonable person believe the encounter was escalating, not de-escalating. Finally, 
the officer never told the driver he was free to leave and began the additional questioning before 
issuing a citation or addressing the alleged violation. Id. 
Unlike Hansen, the traffic stop in this matter had de-escalated to a consensual encounter 
before Officer Westerman asked for consent to search the vehicle. Before Asking for consent, 
Officer Westerman had returned all the driver's documents and had given her a citation for the 
traffic violations, indicating she was free to leave. A reasonable person would have known she was 
free to leave. The second officer was already present before the driver was asked for her consent to 
search the vehicle, so a reasonable person would not have thought the encounter had escalated, as 
was the case in Hansen. Finally, the driver voluntarily came back to the officer with an additional 
comment or question—initiating further conversation herself. It was during this conversation, not 
before, that Officer Westerman asked for consent to search the vehicle. Unlike Hansen, a 
reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances in this case. The court 
concludes that the stop had de-escalated before consent was given and, therefore, the search of the 
vehicle did not exceed the scope of the detention. 
The defense argues that, while the driver may have felt free to leave before consenting to 
search the vehicle, Ms. Harding, as a passenger inside the vehicle during the conversations 
between Officer Westerman and the driver, did not feel free to leave. The court, however, sees no 
need to rule as to whether or not Ms. Harding felt free to leave because the question is irrelevant 
under these circumstances. As explained in Biggegger, "a car passenger does not normally have 
standing to object to a search of the car absent an ownership or possessory interest in the car." 76 
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P.3d at 181. Nowhere m record is there any indication that Ms. Harding had either a possessory or 
ownership interest in the vehicle—she was just a passenger. It is true that she has standing to 
challenge the search because she owned the bags that Officer Westerman ultimately searched, but 
since Officer Westerman lawfully received consent from the only person in the vehicle who had a 
possessory or ownership interest in the vehicle, the search of the vehicle was lawful. To rule 
otherwise would require an officer to gain consent from every passenger before searching a 
vehicle (because each passenger may have personal belongings in the vehicle) and to individually 
tell each passenger that he or she was free to leave. The case law does not support that conclusion. 
Thus, regardless of whether Ms. Harding reasonably felt free to leave or not, Officer Westerman's 
search was proper because the traffic stop had already de-escalated, Officer Westerman received 
consent from the driver, and, therefore, the search did not exceed the scope of the detention. 
B. WERE MS. HARDING'S BAGS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE CONSENT TO 
SEARCH THE VEHICLE? 
It is undisputed that Ms. Harding preserved a legitimate expectation of privacy in her bags 
because she never abandoned them. However, whether or not Ms. Harding had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy becomes irrelevant if Officer Westerman's search of the bags was legal. 
The court directs the parties' attention to Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). In Jimeno, an 
officer gained consent to search a vehicle in which the driver and his wife were occupants. Id at 
249-50. After the passenger stepped out of the vehicle, the officer found a brown paper bag on the 
passenger floorboard with cocaine inside. Id at 250. The United States Supreme Court overturned 
the Florida Supreme Court's ruling that a general consent to search a vehicle did not extent to a 
closed bag on the floorboard. Id. The Supreme Court explained, "[I]f [the driver's] consent would 
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reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth Amendment provides no 
grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization." Wat 252. It further explained, "We think that 
it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search 
respondents' car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs." Id 
at 251. Clearly, then, the standard for determining whether Officer Westerman's search of the bags 
was within the scope of the consent is whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to 
conclude that the bags were part of the consent given. The court concludes that it was. 
There is no indication in the record that Ms. Harding objected to the search of her bags or 
attempted to take those bags with her when she exited the vehicle. Given those circumstances, 
Officer Westerman had no way of knowing whose bags they were; he just proceeded to search the 
contents of the vehicle. As the Supreme Court explained in Jimeno, it is objectionably reasonable 
for an officer to search a container "which might bear drugs." Id. Bags in a vehicle could certainly 
contain drugs, so Officer Westerman's search of Ms. Harding's bags was objectively reasonable. 
Thus, Ms. Harding's bags were not beyond the scope of the consent given to search the vehicle. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, Officer Westerman's action was justified in its inception, the search 
did not exceed the scope of the detention, and Ms. Harding's bags were within the scope of the 
consent given to search the vehicle. Therefore, the court denies the defendant's motion to suppress. 
The State shall prepare the appropriate findings, conclusions, and order and submit them for the 
court's signature. 
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DATED this J2ji*day of June, 2008. 
Mil 
Hoftbrabte Claudj^a^dk 
FourtlteDikrict CdiirtiiSge 
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